Introduction
In early 2016, a six-year-old Californian girl named "Lexi" was taken from the arms of her weeping foster parents, Rusty and Summer Page, 1 and sent to live with her stepsecond-cousin in Utah instead. She had lived with the Pages for four years, after child welfare officials removed her from her drug-addicted mother and incarcerated father.
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Lexi had found love and stability in the Pages' home. She thought of them as "mommy" and "daddy," and regarded their other children as her siblings. 3 Had this been an ordinary case, they would almost certainly have adopted her.
But Lexi was not like other children. Her great, great, great, great-grandparent was a full-blooded Choctaw Indian. That meant that foster-care and adoption proceedings in her case were governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). 4 ICWA gives tribal governments extraordinary power to control the fate of abused, neglected, or abandoned Indian children. It overrides the "best interests of the child" standard, hampers efforts to protect abused children, and imposes race-based restrictions on foster care or adoption of Indian kids.
ICWA was originally intended to prevent the breakup of Indian families and protect children and parents from abusive state officials. 5 Laudable goals, to be sure. But in practice, ICWA often harms children by delaying or denying them placement in stable and loving homes, compelling their reunification with abusive birth parents, and mandating procedures that deprive them of the legal protections they need. In the most extreme cases, children who lack any cultural or political affiliation with a tribe, and do not live on a reservation, are subject to ICWA's burdens solely because their ethnic ancestry renders them "eligible" for tribal membership. 6 As the Supreme Court recently observed in Adoptive Couple v . Baby Girl-one of only two cases addressing ICWA-the Act's mandates put Indian kids at "a unique disadvantage in finding . . . permanent and loving home [s] ," and burden their futures "solely because an ancestor-even a remote one-was an Indian." 7 How is it possible that more than half a century after Brown v. Board of Education, the United States government still maintains a de jure "separate but equal"-or more precisely, separate and substandard-legal system for one racial group? What does it say about the basic principles of our Constitution vis-à-vis our Native American population? And how can this be fixed in a way that respects the legitimate interests of Indian tribes while protecting the most vulnerable Americans?
This article provides a brief overview of the origin and structure of ICWA, focusing on six provisions of the Act that place Indian children in "the ICWA Penalty Box" solely on account of their race. Because this article focuses primarily on cases involving children who do not live on reservations and have no cultural connection to tribes-but who are eligible for membership because of their genetic ancestry-not every argument presented here will be relevant to all ICWA proceedings.
But before beginning, a disclaimer is warranted. American Indian law is fraught with a bloody, tragic, often plainly disgusting history of racism, violence, and even genocide.
That history-which played a prominent role in ICWA's origin 8 -must not and cannot be ignored or treated euphemistically. This article is written in full recognition of the deplorable legacy of abuse and betrayal, mutual incomprehension and prejudice that has plagued relations between Indians and non-Indians in North America. It is tragic that these problems persist to this day-and that ICWA is partly to blame.
Though enacted with good intentions, the provisions of ICWA critiqued below harm Indian children, deprive them of the protection of the "best interests of the child" standard, move them beyond the reach of state protective services, curtail their rights to due process and equal protection, subordinate their interests to those of tribal governments, and cripple efforts to rescue them from abuse and find them stable homes. The "ICWA Penalty Box" obstructs the ability of American Indian children to realize the benefits of their American citizenship.
ICWA's Background
This last point is worth emphasizing. All Indian children are citizens of the United
States, and entitled to the equal protection of the laws. 9 That they are denied such protection today is a disgrace. However noble the intentions behind ICWA's passage, it is today often a cause of abuse. All children, regardless of their ancestry, deserve to be regarded as individuals, and their best interests should be the overriding consideration in cases involving their welfare. The United States owes American Indian children nothing less.
ICWA was enacted in response to efforts during the termination era to assimilate Indian children into American society. At that time, federal policy sought to separate Indian children from their parents 10 and to place them in boarding schools, where many were abused and were punished for speaking Indian languages or practicing traditional religions.
Children were also removed from Indian families under local standards that failed to account for traditional Indian cultural practices.
In passing ICWA, Congress sought to preserve and strengthen Indian families by preempting state child welfare laws that led to family breakup. Among other things, it gives tribal courts exclusive jurisdiction over child custody cases involving tribal members on reservations, orders state and federal courts to give full faith and credit to the child custody decisions of tribal courts, 11 requires notification of parents and tribes regarding involuntary proceedings such as the severance of parental rights, mandates procedures to ensure that tribal members know their rights when asked to sign papers to terminate a parentchild relationship, and employs the "prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community" in child welfare cases.
Had ICWA stopped there, it would hardly be controversial. But it goes further-and falls short-in many other ways.
ICWA's Basic Presumptions
The Rights of Parents, Tribes, and Children
The problems begin with the definition of an "Indian child." Congress, understandably reluctant to interfere with the authority of tribes to determine their own membership, deferred wholesale to tribal authorities on the question of who qualifies as Indian for purposes of ICWA. The Act defines an "Indian child" as any child who is a member of a tribe, or is eligible for membership and is the biological child of a tribal member.
tribal governments in ways that supersede the judgment of parents when the two come into conflict. As one Indian law expert says, "The purpose of ICWA . . . is ultimately to maintain the survival of the tribe through the retention of its members." 20 The idea of government elevating any third party to "parity" with the rights of parents is disturbing and unconstitutional. In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court struck down a Washington state law that forced parents to let "any person" visit with their children whenever a court determined that this would be "in the best interest of the child," even if it ran contrary to the parents' preferences. Six justices found that parental rights, being fundamental rights, could only be infringed for extraordinarily important reasons, and that the Washington statute overrode those rights on too light a basis. Worse, the court suspected that other Washington courts were applying a presumption against parental choices: "In effect, the judge placed on . . . the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her daughters." Given the fundamental status of parental rights, the Supreme Court ruled that parents' choices must be accorded "special weight," over and above the quotidian "best interests" standard.
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ICWA goes even further than the Washington visitation statute. It involves not mere visitation rights, but the far more intrusive matter of tribal jurisdiction to make operative decisions about child foster care, adoption, and other matters, even where those children are not domiciled on a reservation and are not members of tribes (but are only eligible for membership). It allows tribes to block adoption indefinitely while they seek foster and adoptive families of Native American ancestry, and to prohibit it entirely by mandating that children be placed in accordance with tribal preferences. ICWA promotes the interests of a tribe-nonfamily members-above the choices of parents, and does so not on the basis of a "best interests" determination-which, however unclear or "free-ranging" 22 it might be, at least involves an assessment of a child's unique needs.
The Best Interests of the Child
For centuries, the "best interests of the child" standard has been viewed as the essential lodestar for child welfare litigation. 23 A judge must, in the words of Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, "put himself in the position of a 'wise affectionate and careful parent' and make provision for the child accordingly." 24 Courts have called the best interests standard the "touchstone" and the "linchpin" of the law of child welfare. 25 This standard is inherently individualized, meaning that it focuses on the particular interests of the specific child under his or her unique circumstances. 26 ICWA deprives children whose ancestry is Indian of the protection of that rule and substitutes a uniform, often insurmountable presumption that it is in Indian children's best interests to have their futures determined by tribal authorities. Some courts-and the BIA-have taken the position that this presumption overrides individualized consideration of the child's personal best interests, except in the rarest circumstances. 27 And this presumption does not depend on existing social or cultural links between child and tribe, but on the basis of biology. BIA regulations even impose a presumption that ICWA applies when a child is merely suspected of having Indian ancestry.
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ICWA's presumptions also implicate the rights of parents. The rights of birth parents-particularly their fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children-is violated when the government gives a third party rights over the child that are equal to or even greater than their own. 29 ICWA also deprives non-Indian foster and adoptive parents of their right to a legal process that takes no regard of their race or nationality. Non-Indian adults seeking to adopt Indian children face a far greater burden in court, requiring a vast investment of time and money for legal representation. They also face a greater risk Feathers argued that Indian children adopted into non-Indian homes face a higher risk of alcoholism, social disability, and other psychological problems, and are likely to express feelings of alienation and a loss of identity. 37 Perhaps there are such cases, but Split Feathers cannot withstand scholarly scrutiny. It was confessedly unscientific, based on only twenty informal interviews of adults, and it drew untenable causal conclusions based on correlation. For instance, it did not seek to determine whether the problems it identified might have resulted from abuses that subjects experienced before they were removed from their birth families, or from the discrimination that Indians may face in white society, as opposed to the fact of adoption itself. It is impossible to know for sure what role these factors played, because the report indicated no control group, was not peer-reviewed, and the author did not disclose her methodology. 38 Other surveys suffer from similar flaws. 39 More reliable evidence supports the proposition that cross-ethnic adoption is good for children, or at least does not harm them. 40 Even if there were scientific support for the proposition that Indian children are better off when placed with other Indians, it is doubtful that ICWA properly addresses that problem. For one thing, neither the Act nor its implementing regulations apply to tribal court proceedings. 41 This means that tribal courts can, and do, approve foster and adoption placements with non-Indian households. If ICWA is intended to protect Indian children from the allegedly unique injury of being placed with families of other ethnicities, it would make no sense to allow such placements simply because tribal courts order them. Nor does ICWA apply to divorce proceedings, even though divorces frequently involve child custody. State courts can therefore award custody of an Indian child to a non-Indian parent in a divorce proceeding without triggering ICWA-which, again, would be irrational if the Act were aimed at preventing an alleged psychological harm suffered by Indian children being raised by non-Indians.
Some writers have argued that the psychological needs of Indian children are qualitatively different from the needs of non-Indian children. One argues that a child's need for a feeling of household stability and permanency "is a malleable concept," and that Indian children experience permanency "in [their] tie to the native community and the cultural practices of that community," as opposed to permanency in a stable, loving home.
Thus, placing an Indian child in the custody of a family of another race "is not the type of 'permanency" they need. 42 It is doubtful that Indian children inherently have a categorically different psychological experience of permanency than do children with different genes-one that inherently turns on tribal links-but even if it were true, ICWA does not rationally address such concerns. Its adoption and foster placement preferences make no reference to culture or tribe, thereby encouraging adoption of Indian children by "other Indian families" 43 even if they are of entirely different tribal cultural backgrounds. These preferences can also be invoked to override the preferences of Native parents, and by non-Indian birth parents to bar adoptions of which tribal member birthparents approve. 44 And the fact that ICWA does not apply in tribal court means that tribal judges can, and sometimes do, override children's "ties to the native community" and place those children with non-Indian families.
In any event, the notion that Indian children suffer uniquely when they are placed with adoptive families of non-Indian cultural backgrounds cannot justify applying ICWA to offreservation children who have no pre-existing cultural connection to a tribe. A child like Lexi, whose only connection to a tribe is biological, has no cultural ties to preserve-unless, of course, she is to be regarded as biologically different, and consequently destined for a segregated legal regime due to her genetics.
How the ICWA Penalty Box Works
ICWA includes six provisions that diverge significantly from the rules that apply to non-Indian children in foster care and adoption proceedings. These are: (1) jurisdictional rules that mandate transfer of child welfare cases to tribal court and give tribes rights as parties to these cases on a par with the rights of parents; (2) the "active efforts" requirement that essentially requires child welfare workers to return children to the custody of unfit birth parents; (3) the "clear and convincing evidence" standard that it makes applicable in foster care cases; (4) the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard that states must apply in termination of parental rights cases; (5) race-based foster and pre-adoptive placement preferences; and (6) race-based adoptive placement preferences.
Together, these provisions create "the ICWA penalty box"-a set of legal disadvantages that make it harder to protect Indian children from abuse, and to find them permanent adoptive homes.
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Tribal Jurisdiction and Intervention Powers
ICWA gives tribal governments extensive power over cases involving children who are not tribal members and are not domiciled on reservations. Specifically, it requires state courts (in the absence of either parental objection or "good cause" to deviate from ICWA's mandates) to transfer foster care and termination-of-parental-rights proceedings to the courts of the child's tribe, to be determined there. 46 The 2015 BIA Guidelines apply this rule to all stages of custody proceedings, including pre-adoption (guardianship) and adoption proceedings. 47 Parents can block the transfer of foster or termination cases to tribal court, but ICWA also gives tribal governments power to intervene as parties in such proceedings anywhere in the nation if they involve Indian children. 48 Also, if a tribe learns after the fact that a state court decided an adoption matter without tribal involvement, the tribe is entitled to reopen the proceedings and have them nullified. 49 Tribal jurisdiction over children of Indian parents on reservations seems an unremarkable example of in personam and territorial jurisdiction. 50 Holyfield read this authority broadly, to encompass children born to tribal members who left the reservation to give birth, on the grounds that such an act does not change the domicile of a person who is in all other respects domiciled on the reservation. 51 This, too, was unremarkable;
the law of domicile is commonplace in personal jurisdiction law, and immigration law for children born to expatriate parents employs this rule. 52 But ICWA's jurisdictional provisions go much further. Its jurisdiction-transfer provision applies to any case anywhere in the country that involves a child eligible for tribal membership, even if not domiciled on a reservation, and even where no party to the case has any significant contact with the tribe beyond biology. This conflicts with basic jurisdictional principles required by due process of law.
Due process requires that before a court adjudicates a dispute, there must be "contacts" between the forum jurisdiction and the defendant "such that [the defendant]
should reasonably anticipate being summoned to court there." 53 Due process of law simply "does not contemplate" that a court "may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual" who has "no contacts, ties, or relations" to that court's jurisdiction. 54 Where a person has "carr[ied] on no activity whatsoever" in the forum jurisdiction, and has "avail[ed]
[himself] of none of the privileges and benefits of [the forum's] law," then the forum state cannot exercise jurisdiction because there are no "affiliating circumstances" that would satisfy the requirements of "fair play and substantial justice."
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ICWA's grant of nationwide jurisdiction over proceedings involving children with only a biological connection to a tribe plainly exceeds these limits. A child who is merely born eligible for tribal membership-that is, who has the requisite genetic ancestryhas not thereby purposefully availed herself of any privileges of tribal law. One cannot "purposefully avail" oneself of one's ethnicity. Nor have that child's foster or would-be adoptive parents engaged in conduct in connection with the tribal forum such that tribal jurisdiction satisfies fair play and substantial justice. One could hardly imagine, say, a Virginia court asserting personal jurisdiction over a child welfare proceeding in California on the grounds that the child's ancestors came from Virginia, or parents came from Virginia, or that the child was conceived in Virginia. Yet that is essentially the nationwide jurisdiction that ICWA gives to tribes.
Congress's trust obligation to preserve tribal sovereignty cannot excuse ICWA from the mandates of due process and equal protection. However "plenary" Congress's powers with regard to Indians are "'not absolute'" and cannot trump the Constitution. 56 Nobody would contend, for example, that the trust obligation to preserve tribal sovereignty would entitle Congress to, say, forbid Indians from relinquishing tribal membership, or leaving reservations, or marrying non-Indians, or obtaining abortions. 57 All these things would help increase and strengthen tribal membership but Congress's powers with regard to its trust obligation are limited by the Constitution, and particularly by constitutional protections for the rights of American citizens.
As in all cases, personal jurisdiction in ICWA cases must satisfy the requirements of due process, including the "minimum contacts/purposeful availment" analysis. 58 Yet while the minimum contacts requirement is certainly satisfied when a tribal court exercises jurisdiction over tribal members domiciled on the reservation, that requirement is not satisfied in cases involving off-reservation children whose sole connection to a tribe is their biological ancestry.
ICWA's interference with state court jurisdiction also collides with principles of federalism. There is typically no disputing the federal government's power to preempt states with regard to Indian law, but such preemption is problematic when it is stretched to include off-reservation matters involving children who are not members of a tribe, but only eligible for membership for biological reasons. Family law is quintessentially a subject of state concern, left to the purview of the states by the Tenth Amendment. 59 So great is the role of states in this area that federal courts even lack authority to decide divorce or child custody cases in diversity jurisdiction. 60 Primary responsibility for family law is with the states, subject to the limits of federal constitutional protections. The same is true of ICWA. It subjects children whose ethnic ancestry renders them eligible for tribal membership to unequal treatment, and overrides non-discriminatory state law in a way that makes it harder to ensure their safety and to find them adoptive homes.
True, ICWA was intended in part to remedy past discrimination, and Congress has power to override state law when necessary for this purpose. But such intervention imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs. 62 People selling firearms were required to submit information forms to these officers so that background checks could be performed. Notably, the Act instructed officers to "make a reasonable effort" to determine whether a proposed firearm purchase was legal. If an officer determined that a sale would violate the law, the Act required the officer to give the would-be buyer a written explanation. If the purchase was legal, the officer was instructed to destroy the paperwork. policies, but also that they comply with the administration of a federally-mandated body of family law.
The recent BIA Guidelines are even more express in directly commanding state courts. They use the word "must" 101 times while instructing state agencies and officers.
The Guidelines are meant to "clarify the minimum Federal standards, and best practices .
. . to ensure that ICWA is applied in all States consistent with the Act's express language," 70 and include instructions such as: "The agency seeking a[n] . . . adoptive . . . placement of an Indian child must always follow the placement preferences." 71 State courts often insist that the Guidelines are not mandatory, 72 but they are certainly phrased in mandatory language.
In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton thought it so hard to imagine the federal government trying "by some forced constructions of its authority" to "vary the [state] law" relating to inheritance or other domestic matters that only the "imprudent zeal" of the Constitution's opponents could envision such a thing. 73 Yet with ICWA, Congress has not only varied the law of child welfare for one specific ethnic group, but has compelled state officials to develop and implement a special set of standards that deviates from the statelaw norm-often in ways that harm children.
"Active Efforts" to Reunify Families
ICWA differs from state law in many ways, with the result that Indian children are treated differently than children of other ethnicities in cases that are otherwise the same. Given that this law deals with the welfare of abused or neglected children, these differences can have a profound impact on the lives of America's most vulnerable citizens.
Among the most significant of these differences involve efforts to reunify families after children have been taken into state custody. State law, as well as the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 74 requires that child-welfare officials make "reasonable efforts" to reunify families in such cases. 75 But the rules are different for Indian children: in their cases, state officials must make "active efforts" toward reunification. 76 Although some state courts regard these terms as synonymous, 77 most have concluded that "active efforts" imposes a greater obligation on the government to reunite children with families after a removal than does the "reasonable efforts" standard. 78 The BIA's Guidelines take this position, 79 although its new regulations make no explicit determination. 80 As a practical matter, the difference can be enormous. "Active efforts" is typically distinguished from "passive efforts," such as making counseling services or similar opportunities available for parents who wish to reunify their families. While that might satisfy the "reasonable efforts" standard, it is insufficient to discharge a state's duties under ICWA's active efforts mandate. 81 Instead, ICWA requires state social services workers to positively assist in developing parenting skills, obtaining employment, or whatever else the parent must have to retain custody, even if the parent shows little progress or even demonstrates a lack of interest.
The "active efforts" requirement is a delicate balance. provision is so poorly designed that it often has the perverse effect of exposing Indian children to a greater risk of abuse or neglect, and frequently results in delaying or denying protection that the child needs.
Most courts have ruled that because ICWA's active efforts requirement is more stringent than "reasonable efforts," the circumstances that would ordinarily relieve the state of the obligation to reunite the family under the "reasonable efforts" standard do not relieve the state of the obligation to make active efforts. 82 This means that while officials are not required to reunify a non-Indian child with a family after she is removed due to parental substance-abuse problems, or physical or sexual abuse, 83 such a duty does exist with regard to Indian children. Even incarceration of the parent does not relieve state child welfare workers of their duty to actively seek reunification of Indian children and birth parents. 84 The BIA's recently announced Guidelines expand the active efforts requirement, mandating that state officials prove beyond a reasonable doubt that active efforts have been unsuccessful, and prove this through the testimony of an expert witness who is an expert in the culture and customs of the child's tribe (as opposed to an expert on child welfare or child psychology). 85 And the BIA's 2016 regulations provide that the "active efforts"
requirement must apply as soon as state officers have "reason to know"-often merely a suspicion-that a child is subject to ICWA.
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The Supreme Court held in 2013 that "active efforts" are not required in cases where the birth parent has never had contact with the child, in which case there is no Indian family threatened with breakup. 87 But the "active efforts" requirement may be more problematic in cases where the birth parent has had contact, because in such cases, that requirement can force state officials to return children to the very parents who have abused them in the first place.
One example of this is In re Interest of Shayla H., in which Nebraska child welfare officials removed three children, Shayla (12), Shania (11), and Tanya (9) from their birth father, David, due to allegations of physical abuse. Specifically, Shayla had been beaten by David's girlfriend, Danielle (not the children's mother), and child welfare officials found that all three were suffering from neglect. Shania and Tanya were enrolled members of the Sioux tribe, and although Shayla was not, she was eligible for membership. The children were returned to the family, and over the next seven months, David and Danielle participated in counseling services geared toward reunification. However, the children showed signs of continuing problems. The trial court concluded that it was in their best interests that custody remain with state social services, although they were physically returned to the couple. The court also required David to cooperate with state child welfare investigations, to desist from physical discipline of the children, to provide them with therapy, etc.
The Appellate Court reversed, on the grounds that although the state had employed "reasonable" efforts at reunifying the children with David, it had not employed active efforts. The trial court's finding that the children's best interests would be best served by the state retaining legal custody was therefore insufficient. 88 The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed, holding that even though the children remained in the birth parent's physical custody, the decision to withhold legal custody fell short of the active efforts requirement.
Only briefly mentioned in the court's opinion was the fact that "the children were subsequently removed from David's physical custody." ICWA's "active efforts" requirement returns abused children to the custody of abusive adults, forces children to experience the strain of parents' psychological or social problems to a greater degree than other children must experience under the "reasonable efforts" rule, increases the stress on foster families, prolongs the adoption process, and encourages unnecessary technical appeals. 93 Courts in California-one of only two states to embrace the proposition that "active efforts" does not apply when parents prove unfithave observed that ICWA "was not intended as a shield to permit abusive treatment of Indian children by their parents." 94 But in practice, that frequently happens.
Different Burdens of Proof for Foster Care and Termination of Parental Rights
In cases involving non-Indian children, the decision to place a child in foster care is made by employing such burdens of proof as "reasonable grounds," or "probable cause,"
or "preponderance of the evidence." These standards strike a balance between the rights of parents not to lose custody on too light a basis, and the rights of children not to be left in an abusive household simply because officers have been unable to gather definitive evidence. Arizona law, for example, allows state officials to remove a child from an abusive home in an emergency and place that child in temporary foster care if "reasonable grounds exist to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the child," and "probable cause exists to believe" that the child is suffering or will imminently suffer abuse, neglect, or serious emotional injury. 95 Arizona law also uses a "preponderance of evidence" standard in determining dependency-i.e., placing children in long-term foster care. 96 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court employed the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, finding that anything less demanding would violate the due process rights of parents-their interests are too significant to be disposed of on a mere In In re Custody of S.E.G., the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a trial court's finding that three Indian children were better off in the custody of their non-Indian foster parents. Social services removed the children from the birth parents when one was four, another three, and another one year old, and were placed in foster care. Over the three years that followed, they were moved six times before being placed with the non-Indian couple, E.C. and C.C., in 1991. A year later, the children were placed with an Indian family, but that only lasted nine days, before they were returned to E.C. and C.C. Therapists who met with the children emphasized their need for permanent family bonds, particularly one special-needs child. After another year of searching, the tribe was unable to locate an Indian family willing to adopt the three, but E.C. and C.C. were willing, and nobody disputed their fitness. In its adoption proceeding, the trial court received evidence from both lay and expert witnesses, all of whom testified that the couple were providing for the children's physical, emotional, and intellectual needs, but who disagreed as to whether they were providing for the children's "cultural needs." E.C. and C.C. attended powwows and tribal story-tellings, and even arranged a Chippewa naming ceremony for one child. But in any event, the expert witnesses testified that the most important thing was for the children to find stable and secure homes.
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled this concern and reversed the trial court's adoption order. It found that the expert witnesses E.C.
and C.C. offered were not qualified experts specifically on Indian tribal culture and childrearing practices, which meant their testimony was insufficient to support a beyond-areasonable-doubt finding that the children's "cultural needs" were being met. Thus, although nobody disputed that adoption was in the children's best interests, the court found that the best interests standard was improper under ICWA because it is "imbued with the values of majority culture," as opposed to Indian culture.
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Whether or not these cases are correctly interpreted ICWA, these cases demonstrate how the Act's "beyond a reasonable doubt" test delays the removal of children from abusive or neglectful families, and can even force the return of abused children to the very people who abused them-simply because the evidence of abuse is "only" clear and In a foster or pre-adoptive placement, a state court must give preference to members of the extended family (as defined by tribal custom); 112 if none are available, to a foster home approved or specified by the tribe; if none are available, to an Indian foster home approved by a non-Indian authority; and, again, if none are available, to an institution approved by an Indian tribe or an Indian organization. 113 In adoption cases, the court must give preference first to a member of the child's extended family (as defined by the tribe); second, to other members of the child's tribe; and, lastly, to "other Indian families." 114 These placement preferences are based on race, not political or tribal affiliation. 115 The foster care preferences mandate that a child be sent to "an Indian" foster facility approved by "an Indian tribe"-not the child's own tribe-and the adoption preference hierarchy gives preference to "other Indian families" over non-Indians who wish to adopt, even if those families are of a different tribe. 116 It is thus not tribal membership that matters, but generic Indianness. As if that were not enough, the federal Multi-Ethnic Placement Act forbids the denial or delay of an adoption or custody proceeding on the basis of race-but it specifically excludes one group of children from this protection: Indian children.
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Ranking would-be foster and adoptive families in terms of ancestry rather than in terms of the children's best interests is bound to cause problems, and severe problems have indeed resulted. Shortly after their birth in 2010, Laurynn Whiteshield and her twin sister Michaela were removed from their parents and placed with a non-Indian foster family in Bismarck, North Dakota. When county officials sought to terminate parental rights, however, the Spirit Lake Sioux tribe invoked ICWA and had the case transferred to tribal court, which ordered that the children be placed with their grandfather, Freeman
Whiteshield, on the Spirit Lake Reservation, despite the fact that Freeman's wife, Hope
Whiteshield, had a record of child neglect charges. A month later, Hope grew angry at the twins while they were playing outside, and threw them down an embankment. Laurynn died from the head trauma, and Hope was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Michaela was returned to the custody of the non-Indian family from whom she had originally been taken. 118 Even where there is no such abuse, ICWA's foster and adoption preference scheme imposes unnecessary suffering on children who are denied stability and sometimes taken away from homes where they feel safe and loved. This often happens in ways that do not even preserve tribal cultural integrity.
That was true in the case involving Lexi, the six-year-old Choctaw girl in California who was removed from the foster family where she had lived for four years and sent to live with her father's step-second cousins in Utah. Lexi (short for Alexandria) was born in December, 2009, to a mother addicted to methamphetamine, who had lost custody of at least six children before Lexi's birth. 119 Her father had an extensive criminal history.
He was not aware that he was an enrolled member of the Choctaw tribe until after Lexi's placement in foster care, and had no cultural ties to the tribe. 120 Nevertheless, Lexi was subject to ICWA. For four years, she thrived in the Pages' care, came to call them "mommy" and "daddy," and to regard their other children as her siblings, and California courts deemed the Pages her "de facto parents." The "active efforts" to reunify Lexi with her father collapsed in 2012 when the father, having been released from prison, decided he was no longer interested in reunification. At that point, the tribe deemed Lexi's step-second cousins to be "extended family" thanks to their relationship to Lexi's now-deceased grandmother. The step-second cousins, however, had no Native ancestry, and were not tribal members. Nor was there any evidence that they were familiar with Choctaw culture or that placing Lexi with them would ensure that she was exposed to Choctaw tradition.
The Pages urged the court to find "good cause" to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Nobody disputed that the Pages were outstanding parents. Rather, the "good cause" hearing focused on the psychological trauma Lexi would experience if she were removed from their care. Although witnesses testified that she had a strong bond with the Pages and would suffer extreme distress at being separated from them, the trial court nevertheless ordered her removal because the testimony "did not reach to the level of 
ICWA's Foster and Adoption Preferences Deprive Indian Children of Due Process, Equal Protection, and Freedom of Association Rights
ICWA's placement preferences deprive Indian children of their rights to due process, equal protection, and freedom of association.
One of the most basic elements of due process of law 128 is that courts must address the specific facts at issue in a case, 129 and issue individualized judgments rather than impose blanket assumptions premised on a person's race, national origin, or other "immutable characteristic[s] determined solely by the accident of birth." 130 Yet in an ICWA case, the most crucial factor-virtually the deciding factor-is the child's biologicallydetermined Indian status. ICWA's race-based foster and adoption preferences deprive children of the individualized consideration inherent in due process, and because these preferences result in treating them differently than other children due exclusively to their racial or national origin, they also deprive Indian children of the equal protection of the law.
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In addition, ICWA's preferences violate the First Amendment freedom of association.
Tribal membership and family relationships are both forms of association protected by the First Amendment. 131 The right to associate includes the right not to associate. 132 Minors have First Amendment rights, including the right not to associate. 133 Yet ICWA tries to force the formation of tribal and even familial bonds by essentially compelling children to join Indian families based on their biological ancestry, irrespective of their individual best interests. BIA regulations even require state officers to enroll children in tribes if they are not already enrolled. 134 Thus even putting aside the question (discussed below) of whether ICWA establishes a political or a racial classification, the Act's placement preferences are unconstitutional.
The First Amendment forbids government from mandating that people join political associations, 135 make political statements, 136 or pledge allegiance to the government. 137 But ICWA seeks to force one specific class of American citizens to obtain formal membership in a political unit that enjoys attributes of sovereignty. Tribal membership is not ordinary dual citizenship, of course, given the "unique and limited" 138 nature of tribal sovereignty, but tribal membership significantly changes the legal regime that applies to a person, because it "denotes an association with the polity" and imposes an "unequivocal legal bond." 140 A person with dual nationality can be "subject to claims from both nations, claims which at times may be competing or conflicting." 141 The government may not force one group of citizens, defined by ancestry, to obtain citizenship from another sovereign and thereby submit to a change in his legal rights and obligations.
Even more intrusively, ICWA seeks to create Indian families through its preferences as well as through its "active efforts" provision. Freedom of association, a fundamental aspect of individual liberty, includes family relationships, because these are intimate and "involve deep attachments and commitments" to those "few" others with whom one shares "a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs" and the "distinctively personal aspects of one's life. ICWA obviously treats Indian children and families differently from non-Indian children and families. Whether this is constitutional or not depends on whether it is regarded as race-based or as based on the nature of tribes as political units. In the former case, the distinction would be regarded as suspect, and subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, which it certainly could not survive. But if the distinction is based on political identity rather than race, it is subject only to lenient rational basis review.
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a law that gave preference to Indian tribal members in hiring for positions with the BIA. That preference was "political rather than racial in nature," the Court held, and therefore did not trigger strict scrutiny, because it "applie[d] only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes,"
and was "not directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians. Mancari to argue that this distinction was political, instead of racial, but the court disagreed.
Mancari and its progeny involved laws that singled out "'a constituency of tribal Indians,'" not "a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians,'" said the court. The Hawaii law, by contrast, 151 and require state officials to register children for tribal membership if they are eligible. 152 ICWA also applies only to children who are both eligible for tribal membership and who are the biological children of members, meaning that a non-Native child adopted by a tribal member is not subject to ICWA, regardless of cultural or political affiliation. Also, other provisions of ICWA, such as the adoption preference granted to "other Indian families" and the foster-care preferences for "an Indian foster home," expressly apply to the "Indian" race in the abstract, rather than to tribes as specific political entities. Thanks to these provisions, an Alaskan child of Eskimo heritage could be placed with an unrelated member of a Plains Indian tribe in Montana, rather than with a fit, or even fitter, adoptive family of a different race-again, not because of political affiliation, but because of their "Indianness." The ICWA Penalty Box depends not on membership in a political organization, but on the ethnic quality of being Indian. 153 Race was at the forefront of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Adoptive Couple, which involved a child (known as "Baby Veronica") whose Cherokee father had surrendered his parental rights before her birth and who had never even met her. 154 The mother volunteered the child for adoption by a non-Indian family. After her birth, the father withdrew his consent, and two years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court awarded him custody-all based solely on the fact that the girl had Cherokee blood in her veins. The Supreme Court found this improper. Although it resolved the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, it observed that allowing the father to "play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the mother's decision and the child's best interests . . . solely because an ancestor-even a remote one-was an Indian . . . would raise equal protection concerns." 155 ICWA's racial nature is sometimes obscured by the fact that factors in addition to race are used in the Act's definition of "Indian child"-specifically, a child must be both Baby Veronica were subject to ICWA despite lacking any cultural or social connections to a tribe. The deciding factor is genetic.
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A racial category does not cease to be a racial category just because factors other than race play a role in defining the class. As the court put it in Rice, "simply because a class defined by ancestry does not include all members of the race does not suffice to make the classification race neutral." 159 After all, the executive order forcing Japanese Americans into detention centers in World War II applied only to persons with more than one-sixteenth Japanese ancestry. 160 But the fact that not all persons of Japanese heritage were subject to the order did not make that order anything other than a race-based rule subject to strict scrutiny. 161 The law is clear: if race is a but-for factor in the calculus, that calculus is race-based, regardless of the role other factors may play. 162 The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed with good intentions: to stop abuses that broke up Indian families and intruded on legitimate tribal government interests. But six of its provisions-jurisdiction transfer, the "active efforts" requirement, the different standards of evidence for foster care decisions and for terminating parental rights, and the preferences applied to foster placement decisions and to adoption cases-place Indian children in a penalty box, depriving them of critical constitutional protections. This applies even to children whose only connection to a tribe is their biological ancestry. The resulting system of legal segregation cannot be reconciled with this nation's commitments to federalism, equality, and due process of law-or its commitment to the best interests of American Indian children. 30, 52 (1989) . 18 ICWA does allow parents to object when a tribe seeks to transfer jurisdiction over a foster care or termination of parental rights proceeding to its own courts in cases involving children not domiciled or residing within the tribe's reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). But parents do not have similar rights in cases involving children domiciled on a reservation, as in Holyfield. Nor can parents bar a tribe's authority to intervene in a state court proceeding, or block application of ICWA's adoption or foster care placement preferences, or block other applications of ICWA. In re S.B.,
